Knowledge wasn't always about trying to get the final truth.
Philosophy started properly in Ancient Greece with Thales: a pre-Socratic who invented the idea that criticism is good. Instead of following the authority of a wise teacher, he encouraged his students to improve on his ideas.
Xenophanes took this a step further, saying not only may our teachers be wrong, but we never find the final truth –
"For all is but a woven web of guesses".
Thus Xenophanes invented fallibilism: the idea that we all make mistakes – we are fallible – and although we can learn better and approach the truth, we can never be certain.
The point of knowledge was to learn more about the world, by making guesses. Not to collect final truths.
Socrates, following in this tradition, was famous for saying, “The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing.” – by which he meant: nothing with certainty.
Then Aristotle came along and ruined philosophy.
Aristotle wasn't satisfied with fallible guesses. He wanted objective/god-level knowledge, and – rejecting fallibilism – he wanted a way to guarantee he had found the certain truth.
Aristotle shifted the problem from,
“How do we correct errors in our ideas? ” to,
“How do we know for sure our ideas are really true? ”
It wasn't until 2370 years later that Karl Popper identified this shift and named it: justificationism.
Philosophers had taken for granted that the point of knowledge is to have justified, right ideas – instead of simply to improve our always-wrong ideas to be less wrong and explain more.
What is knowledge, then?
Imperfect guesses at the truth.
Knowledge is an incorporeal substance, arising from trying to explain the world through guesses + criticising them and correcting errors in them, which can cause transformations (like making bridges that don't collapse).
Knowledge is solutions to problems.
Knowledge is useful information.
Future parts of this series will cover why justificationism is wrong, where it comes up (teaser: induction is justificationist), and Karl Popper's alternative.