Lulie

/lulie

Lulie

Epistemology applied to everything.

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 7: Karl Popper Is Not Falsificationism

The #1 misconception about Popperian philosophy is that his main idea was falsifiability.

People often call this philosophy 'falsificationism', when really that was a tiny facet of one part of its philosophy of science.

What was falsifiability all about?

There were theories floating around which purported to be science, but which Karl Popper thought were not science:

"What is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?"

It wasn't that he was interested in whether they were true, but whether they had the character of science. Those three theories "posed as science", he said, but "had in fact more in common with primitive myths than with science".

Popper called this the Problem of Demarcation: how do you distinguish science from non-science? What makes science different?

His solution to the problem of demarcation was:

Science is empirically testable. Refutable by experiment.

Here's where people get confused.

Popper was interested in this problem because he wanted to figure out what made some theories pseudo-science.

But his theory had reach – it also answered the question: what makes science different from philosophy.

Something can be non-scientific but true — it just doesn't come under the umbrella of 'science'.

Popper didn't emphasise this, because his original problem was, "Why is Marxism and psycho-analysis pseudo-science?"

So because he didn't emphasise it, everyone is like, "Aha! So everything that doesn't follow Popper's criterion of science is rubbish".

When actually, a lot of things that purport to be science are just philosophy (which may still be valuable!).

What is Popper's main theory if not falsifiability?

Karl Popper's main work was in epistemology, not the philosophy of science. (Although he came via trying to understand things in the philosophy of science.)

The basic gist of his core idea is: we have existing theories, then we criticise them, and modify them to get better theories.

Falsification is just one kind of criticism.

There are lots of other kinds: internal consistency, being contradicted by other things we know, not explaining what it purports to explain, being vague, etc.

Falsification is not even the main kind of criticism in science.

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 6: Epistemological Authoritarianism

The reason most people think authority is bad is it's unjust. It's coercive, it's illegitimate, it's arrogant, it's invalid – they don't have the right.

But there is a deeper reason authority is bad.

In Part 5, I discussed how knowledge actually grows: it's not something you get from a teacher, but rather something you recreate inside yourself, in response to problems you have.

People say argument from authority is bad because it's an invalid argument. Which is true, but why does that matter? Is it so we can safely ignore all arguments that come from authority—because they are unjustified?

That would be justificationism, which is just another kind of authority.

Using an invalid argument is bad because it means the argument doesn't solve the problem you want to solve.

If "Why X?" is answered by "Because I said so.", that doesn't actually answer the question. It's a non-sequitur (Latin for 'does not follow'). Argument from authority is a flaw in the argument – it's sweeping over a part of the explanation.

Explanation that you need in order to solve your problem!

The reason that all authority is bad is not because it is unjust (although it indeed isn't).

Rather, because it's judging ideas not based on whether they solve problems—not by merit—but by who said them.

This sabotages the growth of knowledge.

Authority hampers the ability to improve on ideas. Instead of the best idea winning, whoever has power wins. Might makes right.

Philosopher William Godwin (father of Mary Shelley, author of Frankenstein) in 1797 (!) had this to say:

"Let us consider the effect that coercion produces upon the mind of him against whom it is employed. It cannot begin with convincing; it is no argument. [...] If he who employs coercion against me could mould me to his purposes by argument, no doubt he would. He pretends to punish me because his argument is strong; but he really punishes me because his argument is weak."

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 5: The Bucket Theory of the Mind

It's common sense to think that knowledge gets transferred through words. Books or teachers, or sometimes demonstrations.

However, words (and actions) are always interpreted. To understand what someone is saying, you have to make guesses about their context, goals, premises, and so on.

"It is impossible to speak in such a way that you cannot be misunderstood."

– Karl Popper

So what's always happening is that the student is making their own guesses about what the teacher or book is saying. This is a creative process.

And they're making these guesses for a reason: because it solves a problem they have.

The student may be trying to understand the school's framework so they can pass the exam, or the student may be interested in the content for its own sake. The type of problems the student has informs what kinds of guesses are relevant, and what the student ends up learning.

Philosopher Karl Popper said that knowledge is always created from within, not from without.

This is a slightly archaic way of saying: knowledge is always (re)created by the learner, never 'transferred' by the educator.

The misconception that knowledge is like a substance that is poured from teacher to student is what Popper called the bucket theory of the mind.

In fact, students are not receptive 'buckets'. That is an authoritarian way of thinking about education: it's saying the teacher knows the truth and the student should listen.

People don't learn things for no reason. They learn things when it solves a problem they have. When it resolves a mystery they were curious about, or gets them a practical advantage in life, or dissolves some hardship.

And people don't learn things just because a teacher said they should. Either they think the teacher has legitimacy, or they think they will be punished if they don't obey, or they are genuinely interested in the content.

Learning and knowledge both work using exactly the same process: there is a problem the person is interested in solving, and they are conjecturing solutions.

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 4: Foundationalism

Philosophers sometimes try to get around the infinite regress problem of justificationism (see Part 3) by appealing to an ultimate justification, or foundation.

The point of foundationalism — and simultaneously its downfall — is that it claims there is a foundation which cannot be criticised or improved.

In other words, a dogmatic base.

Why that base and not another? Just 'cuz.

Empirical observation, the Bible, an ultimate goal, an objective function, the laws of logic, biology – these all have been used as a foundation where it's impossible to reason any further.

Under foundationalism, if you disagree on a base, either it's impossible for you to ever agree (because you're coming from different frameworks), or the other person is wrong about which base is dogmatically correct (and they should let Jesus into their life on faith, or else they'll burn for eternity).

This is irrationalism. It says there's something that cannot be reasoned about or with. It's a claim that no progress is possible when it comes to the base – you're stuck with it.

Foundationalism also typically comes with a kind of infallibilism – we can relax because we have certainty that we found the right base, and so long as we build on this base then we can have certain knowledge.

This often leads to a rigid, black-white way of thinking: if we change the base, that undermines all knowledge that's built atop it.

(This sometimes—quite unnecessarily—causes existential crises for people who switch frameworks and have foundationalist intuitions!)

The actual shape of knowledge is more like an interconnected web of guesses.

Each node/guess can be changed – which can affect nodes around it but doesn't tumble the entire structure.

Wrong ideas can be useful and contain truth. It's not the case that they need to be airtight (or justified) to be valuable.

We don't need a foundation. The problem it's trying to solve – how to get justified knowledge – is a bad problem.

This means it's possible to make progress anywhere, in any direction, without having to refer back to an edifice.

“Every point is a boundary point.” — John Wheeler

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 3: Justificationism's Infinite Regress

Justificationism is the idea that the aim of science is to find justified ideas – to seek proof, authority, verification, support, probability, credence.

It sounds intuitive. Who wants unjustified ideas? Aren't unjustified ideas mere subjective opinion at best? Or mysticism? Or meaningless?

But it has a problem:

Trying to have justification for ideas leads to an infinite regress.

Say you believe something, and you think your reasons for believing it justifies this belief.

Well, what justifies those reasons? Presumably other reasons. And what justifies those reasons?...

So, it's never really justified, because each justification relies on another one, and so on.

Many philosophers have made attempts to get around this:

⛪️ Religious philosophers, for example, think the Bible is inherently justified, and you're just supposed to have faith.

🌅 Inductivists say the way to get justification is to make observations that confirm your theory, and the more confirming observations you make, the more justified it is.

🔍 Logical positivists went a step further and said the only meaningful ideas are those that can be verified by observation – i.e. it's not justified unless you can observe it. (Too bad logical positivism can't itself be observed...)

The thing all these philosophers have in common is that they think whatever they use to get around the infinite regress is a source of justification.

They try to solve the problem by using justification.

But there is a solution to this problem, and it does not involve justification at all.

Justificationists ask, "How do we know our theory is true?"

Karl Popper replies, "That's a bad question."

It already implies the infinite regress: it implies the answer must be justificationist. It's really asking, "How can we be justified in thinking that our theory is true?"

What we should be asking is: "How can we find better theories?"

Instead of trying to justify our ideas as right, we should try to find and solve problems with them. Solving problems then makes the theory better: each solution is concrete improvement.

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 2: Presocratic Fallibilism

Knowledge wasn't always about trying to get the final truth.

Philosophy started properly in Ancient Greece with Thales: a pre-Socratic who invented the idea that criticism is good. Instead of following the authority of a wise teacher, he encouraged his students to improve on his ideas.

Xenophanes took this a step further, saying not only may our teachers be wrong, but we never find the final truth –

"For all is but a woven web of guesses".

Thus Xenophanes invented fallibilism: the idea that we all make mistakes – we are fallible – and although we can learn better and approach the truth, we can never be certain.

The point of knowledge was to learn more about the world, by making guesses. Not to collect final truths.

Socrates, following in this tradition, was famous for saying, “The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing.” – by which he meant: nothing with certainty.

Then Aristotle came along and ruined philosophy.

Aristotle wasn't satisfied with fallible guesses. He wanted objective/god-level knowledge, and – rejecting fallibilism – he wanted a way to guarantee he had found the certain truth.

Aristotle shifted the problem from,
“How do we correct errors in our ideas? ” to,
“How do we know for sure our ideas are really true? ”

It wasn't until 2370 years later that Karl Popper identified this shift and named it: justificationism.

Philosophers had taken for granted that the point of knowledge is to have justified, right ideas – instead of simply to improve our always-wrong ideas to be less wrong and explain more.

What is knowledge, then?

Imperfect guesses at the truth.

Knowledge is an incorporeal substance, arising from trying to explain the world through guesses + criticising them and correcting errors in them, which can cause transformations (like making bridges that don't collapse).

Knowledge is solutions to problems.

Knowledge is useful information.

Future parts of this series will cover why justificationism is wrong, where it comes up (teaser: induction is justificationist), and Karl Popper's alternative.

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series - Part 1.5: The March of Progress

In the previous atomic essay, I argued that all our ideas contain falsehoods, using the intuition-pump that even basic statements like "the sky is blue" aren't quite correct.

Before I answer what knowledge is, if not truth, I want to address an objection:

What about more precise theories, like in physics?

Copernicus' theory that planets orbit the sun was more correct than the previous geocentric theory that everything revolves around the world.

But it was still mistaken: it had planets orbit the sun in a circle. Kepler discovered planets move in an elliptical orbit. But we didn't know why they did (or, in detail, how) until Newton.

So, that settles it. Newton's laws are knowledge, and Copernicus' theory was mistaken.

Except Newton got Mercury's orbit wrong.

Einstein came along and corrected Newton's laws.

But that still wasn't the end of it: Today, Einstein's theory of general relativity conflicts with quantum theory.

So the smartest people in the history of the world have all been wrong.

If truth is the criterion for knowledge, nothing we have ever thought qualifies.

And a state of final truth isn't even desirable.

If we had the final truth, that would mean it's impossible to improve in that area. It would be the end of progress. Nothing left to solve, life would be boring.

Part 2 will cover how we came to this view, why Aristotle ruined philosophy, and what is knowledge.

For all that Galileo knew,
Not one of his statements are true.
He fought against the Church and lost
A battle bitter, despite his feat:
Ideas truthlike—but not complete
In a God's-eye view.

User Avatar

Lulie

Knowledge Series

4y ago

Knowledge Series – Part 1: Falsity

Does something that's knowledge have to be true?

That's common sense! If I thought the sky is blue and it were actually green, that wouldn't be knowledge, it'd be a mistake.

But before the discovery of light wavelengths, we had a different understanding of what colour even was. We thought colour was inherent in the object, rather than a mix of properties of the object and an accident of biology that gives us 3 colour receptors instead of 2 or 5.

If you didn't realise this about how colour works, tetrachromats and dichromats would be magic.

It wouldn't be true for someone with tritanopia (blue/yellow colour-blindness) that the sky is blue.

The physical wavelengths would be the same, but wavelengths aren't what produce colour:

Metamerism is the phenomenon that mixes of two wavelengths (like blue and yellow) can look the same as a different wavelength (like green).

Magenta doesn't even exist as a wavelength! It purely arises from an accident of our visual system.

So if we all had tritanopia, language for describing the sky would have evolved differently.

Does that mean it's false that the sky is blue?

Well, if your concept of 'blue' doesn't include wavelengths and different-for-tritanopics – yes, it's false.

But even if it's false, it's still useful information. It contains truth, such as approximating most people's experience.

Turns out all knowledge is like this. None of our knowledge is perfectly airtight. There are always mysteries, problems, contradictions if you look closely enough. The alternative would require omniscience, infallibilism.

If we never have perfect truth, what is knowledge?

Stay tuned for Part 2.